Temporal binding and sense of agency in major depression.

Background: Alterations in the experience of controlling oneself and one's environment are of high relevance to understanding the psychopathology of depression. This study investigated the relationship between Temporal Binding for action-event sequences, sense of agency, self-efficacy and symptom severity in Major Depressive Disorder. Method: We employed the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS) and the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE) to assess explicit Sense of Agency and self-efficacy in a group of 42 persons diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) [20 identifying as female, 19 as male; mean age 37.8 years (± 13.3)] and 40 control persons without a psychiatric diagnosis (CG) [22 identifying as female, 20 as male; mean age 38.0 years ( ± 13.3)]. Depressive symptom severity was measured using the BDI-II. We additionally performed a temporal binding paradigm as a potential correlate to Sense of Agency. Participants partook in a time estimation task judging three intervals (250ms, 450ms, 650ms) while either observing or causing stimulus presentations. The underestimation of intervals following intentional actions causing stimulus presentations (compared to merely observing the stimulus presentation) is interpreted as temporal binding. Results: SoAS scores demonstrated an inverse correlation with depressive symptoms (CG: p=.032, R2=.113; MDD: p<.001, R2=.260) and a positive correlation with GSE scores (CG: p<.001, R2=.379; MDD: p<.001, R2=.254). We found distinct differences in temporal binding between healthy participants and the Major Depressive Disorder group without significant correlation between temporal binding and the SoAS or GSE scores. The data suggest group differences in time estimation particular pertaining to time intervals involving intentional action and increasingly complex multisensory stimuli. Discussion: We investigated parameters of subjective control, namely Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy. Here, we were able to reveal their inverse relationship with depressive symptoms in patients with major depressive disorder, highlighting a profound experience of loss of control with increasing symptom load. Deficits in experiencing control, particularly involving intentional motor actions (and more complex multisensory stimuli), appear to be more pronounced in Major Depressive Disorder, involving not only negative self-efficacy expectations but also an altered Sense of Agency and temporal binding. Temporal binding and SoAS scores did not correlate, adding to the growing evidence that the two measures may not be directly related. We propose that future research be directed at this contiguous relationship between Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy in Major Depressive Disorder.

Impaired recognition of interactive intentions in adults with autism spectrum disorder not attributable to differences in visual attention or coordination via eye contact and joint attention.

Altered nonverbal communication patterns especially with regard to gaze interactions are commonly reported for persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). In this study we investigate and differentiate for the first time the interplay of attention allocation, the establishment of shared focus (eye contact and joint attention) and the recognition of intentions in gaze interactions in adults with ASD compared to control persons. Participants interacted via gaze with a virtual character (VC), who they believed was controlled by another person. Participants were instructed to ascertain whether their partner was trying to interact with them. In fact, the VC was fully algorithm-controlled and showed either interactive or non-interactive gaze behavior. Participants with ASD were specifically impaired in ascertaining whether their partner was trying to interact with them or not as compared to participants without ASD whereas neither the allocation of attention nor the ability to establish a shared focus were affected. Thus, perception and production of gaze cues seem preserved while the evaluation of gaze cues appeared to be impaired. An additional exploratory analysis suggests that especially the interpretation of contingencies between the interactants' actions are altered in ASD and should be investigated more closely.

Temporal binding of social events less pronounced in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

Differences in predictive processing are considered amongst the prime candidates for mechanisms underlying different symptoms of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). A particularly valuable paradigm to investigate these processes is temporal binding (TB) assessed through time estimation tasks. In this study, we report on two separate experiments using a TB task designed to assess the influence of top-down social information on action event related TB. Both experiments were performed with a group of individuals diagnosed with ASD and a matched group without ASD. The results replicate earlier findings on a pronounced social hyperbinding for social action-event sequences and extend them to persons with ASD. Hyperbinding however, is less pronounced in the group with ASD as compared to the group without ASD. We interpret our results as indicative of a reduced predictive processing during social interaction. This reduction most likely results from differences in the integration of top-down social information into action-event monitoring. We speculate that this corresponds to differences in mentalizing processes in ASD.

Dissociating passage and duration of time experiences through the intensity of ongoing visual change.

The experience of passage of time is assumed to be a constitutive component of our subjective phenomenal experience and our everyday life that is detached from the estimation of time durations. However, our understanding of the factors contributing to passage of time experience has been mostly restricted to associated emotional and cognitive experiences in temporally extended situations. Here, we tested the influence of low-level visual stimuli on the experience of passage and duration of time in 10-30 s intervals. We introduce a new paradigm in a starfield environment that allows to study the effects of basic visual aspects of a scene (velocity and density of stars in the starfield) and the duration of the situation, both embedded in a color tracking task. Results from two experiments show that velocity and density of stars in the starfield affect passage of time experience independent from duration estimation and the color tracking task: the experienced passage of time is accelerated with higher rates of moment-to-moment changes in the starfield while duration estimations are comparably unaffected. The results strongly suggest differential psychological processes underlying the experience of time passing by and the ability to estimate time durations. Potential mechanisms behind these results and the prospects of experimental approaches towards passage of time experience in psychological and neuroscientific research are discussed.

Brief Report: Preferred Processing of Social Stimuli in Autism: A Perception Task.

In this study we investigate whether persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) perceive social images differently than control participants (CON) in a graded perception task in which stimuli emerged from noise before dissipating into noise again. We presented either social stimuli (humans) or non-social stimuli (objects or animals). ASD were slower to recognize images during their emergence, but as fast as CON when indicating the dissipation of the image irrespective of its content. Social stimuli were recognized faster and remained discernable longer in both diagnostic groups. Thus, ASD participants show a largely intact preference for the processing of social images. An exploratory analysis of response subsets reveals subtle differences between groups that could be investigated in future studies.

Temporal binding is enhanced in social contexts.

Temporal binding (TB) refers to an underestimation of time intervals between two events, most commonly for actions and their effects. This temporal contraction is measurable for both perceived changes in social stimuli such as faces, as well as for interactions with a partner. We investigated TB in two separate experiments to uncover the individual influences of (i) participants' belief in an interaction with a human partner (as compared to a computer), and (ii) a face-like stimulus versus an abstract stimulus mediating the interaction. The results show that TB is more pronounced when self-initiated actions result in a personal event as opposed to a mere physical effect, being suggestive of a "social hyperbinding." The social hyperbinding effect appeared to be driven both by the belief in interacting with another person and by a face-like stimulus. However, there seemed to be no further enhancing effect when combining the top-down processes ("beliefs") with the bottom-up processes ("perceptions"). These findings suggest a prioritization of social information for TB regardless of whether this information is introduced by top-down (beliefs) or bottom-up information (stimuli). Our results add to existing literature demonstrating an increase in action-event monitoring for social cues.

The Temporality of Situated Cognition.

Situated cognition embeds perceptions, thoughts, and behavior within the contextual framework of so-called "4E cognition" understanding cognition to be embodied, enactive, extended, and embedded. Whereas this definition is primarily based on the spatial properties of a situation, it neglects a fundamental constituent: the cognitive situation as enduring. On a subpersonal level, situated cognition requires the integration of information processing within a minimal temporal extension generating the basic building blocks of perception and action ("microlayer" of time). On a personal level, lived situations and experienced narratives leading to our biography can be defined by their broader temporal horizons ("macrolayer" of time). The macrolayer of time is based on and emerges from information processing on the microlayer of time. Whereas the constraints on the microlayer are primarily defined by the integrity of neurobiological processes within an individual cognitive system, the temporal horizons and subsequently the situational context on the macrolayer are defined by the complex affordances of a situation on a personal or interpersonal level. On both time layers, cognition can be defined as a continuous dynamic process, reflecting the transition from one situated state to another. Taken together, the events forming the delimiting horizons of these situations correspond to the temporal structure of the cognitive process along which it continuously proceeds. The dynamic driving and enabling this transition from state to state is synonymous with the inherent flow of time. Just as the layers of time, flow and structure, are inseparably connected. The integration of temporal flow and temporal structure into the continuous dynamic process constitutes the enduring situatedness of cognition. By providing everyday examples and examples from psychopathology, we highlight the benefits of understanding cognitive processes as part of enduring situations.

Disturbed Experience of Time in Depression-Evidence from Content Analysis.

Disturbances in the experience of time have been a commonly reported feature of depressive disorders since the beginning of modern psychiatry and psychological research. However, qualitative research approaches to investigate the phenomenon are rarely used. We employed content analysis to investigate disturbances of time experience in Major Depressive Disorder. Our analysis from 25 participants showed that individuals with Major Depressive Disorder subjectively seem to have lost the ability to influence or change the present, resulting in an impersonal and blocked future. The present is rendered meaningless, the past unchangeably negative, and the passage of time turned into a dragging, inexorable, and viscous continuance. The overall,-possibly intersubjective-concept of time experience, remains largely intact, causing or adding to depressive mood and suffering. We elaborate on how these findings reflect previous theories on the experience of time in depression. This study might encourage future inquiries into both the phenomenal and neuroscientific foundation of time experience under psychopathological conditions.